The Chinese government has kept tight reins on both new and traditional media in order to avoid possible subversion of its own power. Its strategies frequently entail rigorous media controls shuttering publications or sites using tracking systems and firewalls, and jailing dissident journalists, bloggers, and activists. Headlines were caught by the harshness of media censorship in early when Southern Weekly, a liberal-leaning paper situated in Guangzhou, staged a weeklong confrontation with all the government after propaganda authorities that are local rewrote a frontpage pro-reform editorial. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s granting of the 2010 Peace Prize to jailed Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo, as well as Google’s fight together with the Chinese government over Internet censorship in China, have additionally raised international interest to media censorship in the united states. In once, the nation’s burgeoning market has allowed for greater diversity in the media coverage in China, and specialists say the growing Chinese interest in advice is examining the control of the regime.
Official Media Policy
China’s constitution affords its citizens freedom of speech and press, but the opacity of Chinese media regulations permits authorities to crack down by asserting that state secrets are exposed by them and so endanger the united states. The Chinese government revised its present Law on Safeguarding State Secrets to tighten control. The change reinforces demands for telecommunications operators and Internet companies to work with Chinese authorities in investigations. However, the definition of state secrets in China stays obscure, easing censorship of any advice that authorities deem dangerous for their economical or political interests. CFR Senior Fellow Elizabeth C. Economy says the Chinese government is in a state of “schizophrenia” about media policy as it “goes back and forth, examining the line, understanding they want press freedom and the advice it supplies, but worried about opening the door to the kind of independence that could lead to the regime’s downfall.”
In May 2010, the government issued its first white paper online that highlighted the notion of “Internet sovereignty,” requiring all Internet users in China, including foreign organizations and people, to abide by Chinese laws and regulations. Chinese Internet companies are actually needed to sign the “Public Pledge on Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry,” which entails even stricter rules than those in the white paper, in accordance with Jason Q. Ng, a specialist on Chinese media censorship and writer of Blocked on Weibo.
The watchdog group Reporters without Borders rated China 173 out of 179 nations in its 2013 global index of press freedom. Reporters face harassment and jail time for breaking rules, and therefore are efficiently forced into “self censorship.” Former CFR Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow Matt Pottinger says that Chinese media outlets generally use their own computer screens to ensure political acceptability of their content. Censorship guidelines are circulated to leading editors and media suppliers from the authorities Bureau of Internet Affairs as well as the Communist Party propaganda section. March 2010 leaked variant lists some of the prohibitions.
Previously, media could be owned by only state agencies but now there’s increased private possession. China News Network Corporation (CNC), a twenty four-hour international news network established in July 2010, as an example, is apparently half independently funded. Pottinger contends that the increase hasn’t always produced plurality even though the government maintains the quantity of publications has proliferated recently. The newest publications stay “a populist, socialist media, just as commanded from the authorities,” he says. “The apparently chatty, freewheeling press isn’t actually freewheeling in any way. The Chinese Communist Party is only more cunning about the way that it controls public opinion.”
Specific sites the government deems possibly dangerous–like Wikipedia–are blocked during intervals of controversy, including the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Special content considered a danger to political stability can be prohibited, including search terms and contentious photographs. With Chinese social networking blocking even obscure, tertiary references to the event, the censorship across the Tiananmen anniversary reached new peaks, in June 2013.
The government is very keen on blocking reports of problems which could incite social unrest, like ethnic strife and official corruption. After reports ran on the private wealth of Premier Wen Jiabao and Party Secretary Xi Jinping the sites of the New York Times as well as Bloomberg were blacked out in 2012. Constraints were also put on micro blogging services in April 2012 in response to rumors of a coup attempt. Online media businesses Sina Corp. and Tencent Holdings Ltd. were compelled to shut down the commenting function–a crucial attribute for discussions–for three days. Censors were also fleet to block any reference of an October 2013 assault on Tiananmen Square by people from Xinjiang province, home to the mainly Muslim Uighur minority group.
More than a dozen government bodies apply and review laws into, and from China. The strongest observation body is the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD), which coordinates with General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) to ensure content encourages party doctrine. The state news agency, Xinhua, is broadly considered a propaganda tool. Ng says the various ministries functioned as smaller fiefdoms of control, but have lately been more combined underneath the State Council Information Office, which has taken the lead on Internet monitoring.
The CPD gives media outlets directives in addition to editorial guidelines limiting coverage of issues that are sensitive. In one high profile incident affecting liberal Guangdong magazine Southern Weekly, government censors rewrote the newspaper’s New Year’s message to the Communist Party into a homage from a call for reform. Mass protests were triggered by the move by the staff and general people, who demanded the resignation of the area propaganda agency leader. While censors and staff achieved a compromise that could theoretically loosen some controls, a lot of the censorship stayed in place, as well as the calls for resignation were blown off.
China’s government also stiffens censorship in times of political transition; before its Eighteenth National Congress power handover in late 2012, it issued new rules requiring Internet users to offer actual names to service providers, while delegating Internet companies greater obligation for reporting banned postings to the authorities.
The Chinese authorities deploys of censoring the Internet myriad ways. Specialists say it contains the wholesale blocking of access to sites, in addition to technical processes like bandwidth throttling, key word filtering. Google, following a protracted struggle with Chinese authorities on the prohibition of search terms, gently gave up its fight by turning off a telling that alarmed Chinese users of possible censorship in 2013. But as Ng points out, the authorities also uses a varied array of techniques to get journalists to censor themselves. Such strategies include demotions and dismissals, libel suits, fines, arrests, and the shuttering of news outlets.
Activists and journalists who overstep bounds may also confront prison; seventy netizens and by February 2014, thirty journalists — online journalists, bloggers, or cyber-dissidents–are imprisoned, according to Reporters without Borders. In 2009, rights that are Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to eleven years in prison for advocating democratic reforms and freedom. Censors immediately blocked news of the prize. A year after, journalist Tan Zuoren was sentenced to five years in prison for bringing focus to government corruption and inferior building of school buildings that fell and killed a large number of kids in Sichuan province during the 2008 quake. The Chinese government blocked all inquests to the matter, and the volunteers of Tan were harassed and beaten. 2014 saw the authorities hand a four-year prison sentence was targeted due to his growing existence on Chinese social networking programs.
The Xi government, in power has tightened the reins. A fresh July 2014 directive passes pubs reporters from releasing info from press conferences or interviews without permission of the company media organizations on social media. The government also said it would not allow individuals who neglected to sign the secrecy agreement press passes.
Publicizing the CPD guidelines additionally invites punishment, as they could possibly be categorized as “state secrets.” Such was the case of Shi Tao, a journalist who served eight years in jail in a Yahoo! e-mail, the directions for the best way to report the fifteenth anniversary of the CPD. Pottinger includes that on top of such constraints that are national, local officials release their particular directives. A few of these have limited advice in the expense of public health, as in early 2014, when provincial authorities were requested by the national domestic fowl organization in China to prevent reporting individual instances of H7N9 bird flu illnesses, dreading damage to gains.
All inbound data are filtered through one of three computer facilities in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou, where authorities are alerted by key words to content that was provocative. The Foreign Correspondents Club of China has since ceased printing figures on its site to make sure its continued operation, although it reported 178 instances of interference with foreign media in 2008.
International journalists face limitations on their reporting, surveillance, and government intimidation although foreign media can not be censored, writes freelance China correspondent Paul Mooney, who was refused visa. The government’s propaganda agencies also have cracked back on reporters’ engagement with foreign media outlets; expert journalist Gao Yu was detained in May 2014 for supposedly leaking a Celebration record to the foreign press, and two months after, China Fortune reporter Song Zhibiao was made to step down for composing comments for the Hong Kong-based Oriental Press Group. In August 2014, authorities released Xiang Nanfu, a contributor to the U.S.-based Chinese-language news website Boxun.com, after detaining him on charges of fabricating reports that disparaged the Chinese government ahead of the twentyfifth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
China has used this to stop journalists from reporting on potentially sensitive issues like corruption and needs foreign correspondents to have permission before reporting in the united states. Austin Ramzy, a China reporter relocated to Taiwan after neglecting to receive visa and his certification. New York Times reporter Chris Buckley was reported to possess been expelled in early January 2013–an episode China’s international ministry clarified as a visa application suspension as a result of improper qualifications. The 2013 suspension notably shook China observers after Bloomberg journalists accused the news agency of withholding fact-finding posts from Chinese authorities for anxiety about reprisal. “Taken collectively, that is the Chinese government’s most comprehensive attempt in decades to roll back unwanted foreign coverage–and that increases the positions for news organizations which are fighting to learn how to handle China,” writes Evan Osnos, a former China correspondent for the New Yorker.
Foreign reporters’ treatment is now a diplomatic problem. In response to the Arab Spring demonstrations in early 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed to continue U.S. attempts to weaken censorship in countries with repressive governments like China and Iran. In response, China warned Washington to not meddle in other countries’ internal matters. On a December 2013 excursion to Beijing, Vice President Joe Biden pressed China openly and in private about press freedom, directly raising the matter in discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping and assembly with U.S. journalists working in China. In the aftermath of Ramzy’s refused visa, White House spokesman Jay Carney additionally issued a statement encouraging China to unblock U.S. media sites and remove travel limitations on journalists.
Circumventing the Censors
Even with the orderly constraint of news, the Chinese people has found methods to get news past censors through proxy servers and virtual private networks (VPNs), in addition to through microblogging websites like Weibo that have become the main spaces for Chinese netizens to express view or discuss taboo topics. “Over time, in some cat-and-mouse games, Chinese Internet users have developed an extensive number of puns–both visual and homophonous–slang, acronyms, memes, and pictures to evade limitations and censors,” writes Ng.
Google’s chairman, Eric Schmidt, said that encryption could help the business penetrate China. But such measures experienced drawback when authorities cracked down on social networking program WeChat (known as Weixin in China), deleting reports that were outstanding, politically liberal. Shortly afterward, the government announced new regulations on “instant messaging programs” aimed at cellular chat programs like WeChat, which includes more than 270 million users and was increasingly seen as replacing Weibo as a platform for popular dissent which could evade censors. The Market of cFR says the Internet has become a means to make sure rule of law and official responsibility, noticing the growing need for social network websites as a political power inside China despite government limitations.
China had about 618 million Internet users at the time of December 2013. Although there happen to be vocal calls for complete press freedom in China, some experts point into a more nuanced discussion of the ways the Internet is revolutionizing a society which is requiring more information as well as the Chinese media landscape. “Some folks in China do not look at freedom of speech as an intangible ideal, but more as a means to an end,” writes Emily Parker. Instead, the fight for free expression matches into a bigger context of burgeoning citizen focus to other, more relevant societal efforts like environmental degradation, social inequality, and corruption–problems that they make use of the Internet and media as a way of disseminating advice, says Ng.